Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered

This collection of original essays explores the topic of skeptical invariantism in theory of knowledge. It eschews historical perspectives and focuses on this traditionally underexplored, semantic characterization of skepticism. The book provides a carefully structured, state-of-the-art overview of skeptical invariantism and offers up new questions and avenues for future research. It treats this semantic form of skepticism as a serious position rather than assuming that skepticism is false and attempting to diagnose where arguments for skepticism go wrong. The essays take up a wide range of different philosophical perspectives on three key questions in the debate about skeptical invariantism: (1) whether the standards for knowledge vary, (2) how demanding the standards for knowledge are, and (3) whether the kind of evidence, reasons, methods, processes, etc. that we can bring to bear are sufficient to meet those standards. Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in epistemology and the philosophy of language.

Christos Kyriacou is a Lecturer at the University of Cyprus and received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of Edinburgh. His main interests lie in epistemology, metaethics, and their intersection. Kevin Wallbridge works on issues in epistemology, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind. He has been a Lecturer at the University of Southampton and a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Cyprus. His PhD in Philosophy is from the University of Edinburgh.

1. Introduction Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge Part I. The Source of Skepticism 2. Sceptical Invariantism and the Source of Scepticism Sceptical Invariantism and the Source of Scepticism Duncan Pritchard 3. Epistemic Standards: Impersonal, not Invariant Krista Lawlor Part II. Arguments for Infallibilist Skepticism 4. A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism Nevin Climenhaga 5. Skeptical Invariantism, Considered Gregory Stoutenburg 6. Moderate Pragmatic Skepticism, Moorean Invariantism, and Attributions of Intellectual Virtue/Vice Christos Kyriacou Part III. Arguments for Fallibilist Skepticism 7. In Defense of a Moderate Skeptical Invariantism Davide Fassio 8. A (Partial) Defence of Moderate Skeptical Invariantism Robin McKenna 9. Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation Michael Hannon 10. Situationism, Implicit Bias, and Skepticism Kevin Wallbridge Part IV. Wittgensteinian Anti-Skepticism 11. "I Know", "I know", "I know." Hinge Epistemology, Invariantism and Skepticism Annalisa Coliva 12. 'Logical' and 'Epistemic' Uses of 'to Know' or 'Hinges' as Logical Enabling Conditions Genia Schönbaumsfeld Part V. Assertion and Knowledge Discourse 13. Assertion Compatibilism Mona Simion 14. Knowledge and Loose Talk Alexander Dinges 15. Knowledge Claims and the Context of Assessment Wayne A. Davis