Quiet Wars

Quiet Wars documents how and why the U.S. Navy developed its human intelligence (HUMINT) capability between 1931 and 1964, by examining the evolution of HUMINT through the lens of crises in East Asia. From the emergence of radio technology and its use in intelligence collection during World War I, navies began focusing much of their intelligence collection efforts in the communications domain. Nevertheless, the reality of naval intelligence requirements could not ignore HUMINT (then, and into the early Cold War, generally referred to as espionage) because when technological means failed, naval officers still needed to obtain critical information. This book assesses the HUMINT in crises and determines the Navy and Marine Corps’ role in each. It traces naval HUMINT over a rapidly changing period in the Asia Pacific, the institutional  and operational milestones during each unique period, and the overall impact intelligence had on the Fleet’s role in each crisis documented. Those include: the Navy and Marine Corps’ presence in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-1941); the Chinese Civil War and Communist Revolution (1945-1949); the Taiwan Crises 1954-55 and 1958; and Kennedy–Johnson containment policy in Indochina (1961–1965). Ultimately, the research reveals that, at times, the use of HUMINT greatly influenced the ability to enable decisions in crises, but this fact was ultimately marginalized due to institutionalized biases that undermine the importance of intelligence on purpose. While this makes sense broadly, intelligence collection and analysis are not often associated with the lynchpin of naval battles but rather as part of the conditions prior to battle, or in political attempts to avoid conflicts.

By Brian Ellison