Epistemic Injustice

This much-needed introduction explains what epistemic injustice is and examines it from a philosophical standpoint. With chapter summaries, further reading, and a glossary, it is an ideal starting point for anyone coming to the topic for the first time.

Aidan McGlynn is a Senior Lecturer in the Philosophy Department at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, and a Senior Research Associate at the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. He is author of Knowledge First? (2014), a co-editor-in-chief of Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, and co-editor with Jennifer Lackey of The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology (2025).

Acknowledgements Preface Part 1: What is Epistemic Injustice? 1. Introduction: Epistemic Matters 2. Asking for the Moon: Examples of Epistemic Injustice 3. The Nature and Scope of Epistemic Injustice 4. Situating Epistemic Oppression Part 2: Being Believed 5. The Central Case of Testimonial Injustice 6. Testimonial Injustice, Prejudices, and Credibility Deficits and Excesses 7. Epistemic Violence and Silencing Part 3: Being Understood 8. The Central Case of Hermeneutical Injustice 9. Incidental Hermeneutical Injustice and Hermeneutical Marginalisation 10. Contributory Injustice and Epistemic Oppression Part 4: Primary Harms of Epistemic Injustice 11. Identifying Primary Harms of Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustice Part 5: Epistemic Justice 12. Towards Epistemic Justice. Index