The Phenomenal and the Representational

There are two main ways in which things with minds, like us, differ from things without minds, like tables and chairs. First, we are conscious--there is something that it is like to be us. We instantiate phenomenal properties. Second, we represent, in various ways, our world as being certain ways. We instantiate representational properties. Jeff Speaks attempts to make progress on three questions: What are phenomenal properties? What are representational properties? How are the phenomenal and the representational related?

Jeff Speaks received his PhD from Princeton in 2003, and has taught at McGill University and the University of Notre Dame.

- I: Two kinds of properties of subjects - II: From transparency to intentionalism - III: Intermodal intentionalism and nonconceptual content - IV: The metaphysics of representational properties - V: Availability and the scope of perceptual representation - VI: How many phenomenal relations? - VII: Phenomenal identity and indiscriminability - VII: The reduction of phenomenal properties