How the Taliban Regained Power in Afghanistan

This book examines how the Taliban were able to regain power in Afghanistan in 2021, some 20 years after the US intervention.

Mona Kanwal Sheikh is senior researcher and head of Global Security and Worldviews at DIIS. She is an expert on Islamist and jihadist movements and has particularly studied the Taliban movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan since 2007. Jan Werner Mathiasen is an officer in the Danish Armed Forces Defence with extensive knowledge of the war in Afghanistan, gained in part through his deployment to Afghanistan in 2010. He is employed as a military analyst at the Royal Danish Defence College, where he lectures in military strategy and international politics. Lars Erslev Andersen is an historian of ideas and a senior researcher at DIIS. He has extensive expertise in the Middle East and has published several books on Afghanistan and the War on Terror. His expertise also encompasses American Middle East policy and security thinking. Dino Krause is an independent researcher who was formerly affiliated with a project on transnational jihadism at DIIS. He is an expert on al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and has worked extensively with analyses of quantitative conflict data. Ole Wæver is a professor of international relations at the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, where he also directs the Centre on Resolution of International Conflicts. He has authored and edited many books on international security, including key contributions to the field of security studies.

Preface 1. Introduction 2. The Taliban: Their Strength and Strategy 3. Negotiations with the Taliban 4. The US War in Afghanistan 5. Military Capacity Building: The Main Problems 6. The Civilian Capacity Building: The Main Problems 7. Conclusion: What Can We Learn from the War in Afghanistan? Appendix A: On Learning