Routledge Handbook of Subnational Constitutions and Constitutionalism

This handbook provides a toolbox of definitions and typologies to develop a theory of multilevel constitutionalism and subnational constitutions. The volume examines systems with subnational entities that have full subnational constituent autonomy and systems where subnational constituent powers, while claimed by subnational governments, are incomplete or non-existent. Understanding why complete subnational constituent power exists or is denied sheds significant light on the status and functioning of subnational constitutions. The book deals with questions of how constitutions at multiple levels of a political system can co-exist and interact. The term 'multilevel constitutionalism', recognized as explaining how a supranational European constitution can exist alongside those of the Member States, is now used to capture dynamics between constitutions at the national, subnational and, where applicable, supranational levels. Broad in scope, the book encompasses many different types of multi-tiered systems world-wide to map the possible meanings, uses and challenges of subnational or state constitutions in a variety of political and societal contexts. The book develops the building blocks of an explanatory theory of subnational constitutionalism and as such will be an essential reference for all those interested in comparative constitutional law, federalism and governance.

Patricia Popelier is Full Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Antwerp, director of the Research Group on Government and Law, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Kent, Centre for Federal Studies and co-promoter of the Centre of Excellence GOVTRUST. Giacomo Delledonne is Assisant Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law at the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa, Italy. Nicholas Aroney is Professor of Constitutional Law and Fellow of the Centre for Public, International and Comparative Law at the University of Queensland.

- Subnational Constitutionalism: Defining subnational constitutions and self-constituent capacity - Subnational Constitutionalism in Argentina: Provincial autonomy in a uninational federation - Subnational Constitutionalism in Australia: State autonomy in a uninational federation - Subnational Constitutionalism in Austria: The pluralisation of homogeneity - Subnational constitutionalism in Belgium: A matter of abstained maturity - Subnational Constitutionalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Towering sub-national autonomy and a loose clamp of the central level to all intents and purposes - Subnational Constitutionalism in Brazil: The space of state constitutions for improving Brazilian federalism - Subnational Constitutionalism in Canada: A hysteretic approach to distinctive constitutional identities - Subnational Constitutionalism in Ethiopia: Constitutional déjà vu - Subnational Constitutionalism in Germany: Constitutional autonomy, unitarian federalism, and intertwined policy-making - Subnational Constitutionalism in India: Subnational constitutionalism or constitution within the constitution? - Subnational Constitutionalism in Italy: Unfulfilled Expectations? - Subnational Constitutionalism in Malaysia: Weak states in a strong federation - Subnational Constitutionalism in Mexico: Medium state autonomy in a centralized federation - Subnational Constitutionalism in South Africa: An empty promise - Subnational constitutionalism in Spain: Confluence of wills in a basic institutional norm - Subnational Constitutionalism in Switzerland: A sleeping beauty awaiting to be kissed - Subnational Constitutionalism in the United Kingdom: Constitutional statutes within the context of an uncodified constitution - Subnational Constitutionalism in the United States: Powerful states in a powerful federation Conclusion: Nine hypotheses to explain variation in subnational constitutional autonomy