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This book examines the response of financial regulators to the problem of banks being 'too big to fail'. David Howarth and Scott James explore the politics of bank structural reform across six key jurisdictions, and propose a novel framework for analysing the influence of financial industry influence.
David Howarth has been a Full Professor at the University of Luxembourg since 2012 and was previously a Jean Monnet Chair at the University of Edinburgh. He works on European political economy topics, with specific focus on financial regulation and economic and monetary union. His many publications include The Political Economy of Banking Union (with Lucia Quaglia; OUP, 2016), The Difficult Construction of European Banking Union (with Joachim Schild; Routledge, 2020), and Regional Development Banks in the World Economy (with Judith Clifton and Daniel Fuentes; OUP 2021).
Scott James is a Reader in Political Economy at King's College London, having previously held visiting positions at the Blavatnik School of Government (University of Oxford) and the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI). His research interests relate to the political economy of finance and financial regulation; Britain, Europe and the City of London; and the role of economic ideas and knowledge in policy making. He has published over twenty articles in international journals and his book The UK and Multi-Level Financial Regulation: From Post-Crisis Reform to Brexit (with Lucia Quaglia) was published in 2020 by Oxford University Press.
1: Introduction: The Puzzle of Bank Structural Reform
2: A Comparative Financial Power Approach
3: Failing to Tame Too-Big-To-Fail Banks
4: From Obama to Trump: Contested Reform in the United States
5: The Importance of Being Vickers: Venue Shifting in the United Kingdom
6: Germany: Defending Deutsche Bank AG
7: Protecting National Bank Champions in France
8: The Netherlands: Shifting Structural Reform Off the Agenda
9: Liikanen's Legacy: Financial Power and Political Stalemate in the European Union
10: Conclusion: Contribution and Future Research
