The Routledge Handbook of Propositions

Propositions are routinely invoked by philosophers, linguists, logicians, and other theorists engaged in the study of meaning, communication, and the mind. To investigate the nature of propositions is to investigate the very nature of our connection to each other, and to the world around us. As one of the only volumes of its kind, The Routledge Handbook of Propositions provides a comprehensive overview of the philosophy of propositions, from both historical and contemporary perspectives. Comprising 33 original chapters by an international team of scholars, the volume addresses both traditional and emerging questions concerning the nature of propositions, and our capacity to engage with them in thought and in communication. The chapters are clearly organized into the following three sections: I. Foundational Issues in the Theory of Propositions II. Historical Theories of Propositions III. Contemporary Theories of Propositions Essential reading for philosophers of language and mind, and for those working in neighboring areas, The Routledge Handbook of Propositions is suitable for upper-level undergraduate study, as well as graduate and professional research.

Adam Russell Murray is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manitoba. He works primarily in metaphysics and the philosophy of language. Chris Tillman is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manitoba. His research interests include metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and philosophy of art.

Introduction Part I: Foundational Issues in the Theory of Propositions 1. The Linguistic Basis for Propositions 2. Propositions, Posits, and States of Affairs 3. Instrumentalism about Structured Propositions Part II: Historical Theories of Propositions 4. Ancient Theories of Propositions 5. Medieval Theories of Propositions: Ockham and the Later Medieval Debate 6. Lockean Propositions 7. Kant, Propositions, and Non-Fundamental Metaphysics 8. Bolzano's Theory of Satz an sich 9. Frege on Thoughts 10. Russell on Propositions Part III: Contemporary Theories and Further Issues 11. Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities 12. Truthmaker Accounts of Propositions 13. Syntactically Structured Propositions 14. Propositions as Interpreted Abstracta 15. The View of Propositions as Types of Actions 16. Cognitive Propositions: Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Empirical Adequacy 17. Propositions as Cambridge Properties 18. Why 0-Adic Relations Have Truth Conditions: Essence, Ground, and Non-Hylomorphic Russellian Propositions 19. Propositions without Parts 20. Hylomorphic Propositions 21. Temporal Propositions and Our Attitudes toward the Past and the Future 22. Frege's Other Puzzle: Relativity in Propositional Content 23. Propositions and Attitudes De Se 24. Propositional Dependence and Perspectival Shift 25. Attitudinal Objects and Propositions 26. Propositions as Objects of the Attitudes 27. The Varieties of Gappy Propositions 28. Plenitudinous Russellianism 29. Semantic Relationism 30. Propositions and Questions 31. The Propositional Benacerraf Problem 32. Reference, Propositions, and the World 33. Propositional Paradox