Epistemic Injustice: An Introduction

Epistemic injustice is one of the most important yet complex subjects to have emerged in philosophy in recent years. It refers to the idea that a person can be wronged when they are not properly believed or understood due to factors like prejudice and ignorance. In this clear and much-needed introduction, Aidan McGlynn explains what epistemic injustice is and examines it from a philosophical standpoint. He covers the following key topics and questions: - What is epistemic injustice and why is it significant? - What is epistemic oppression, and how does it differ from epistemic injustice? - The relationship between different theories of epistemic injustice - Testimonial injustice - Hermeneutical injustice - Primary harms of epistemic injustice - How to make progress towards epistemic justice. Throughout this book McGlynn connects the conceptual aspects of epistemic injustice to pressing real-life examples of prejudice and ignorance, including those relating to gender, race, and disability. With the inclusion of chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading, and a glossary of key terms, Epistemic Injustice: An Introduction is an ideal starting point for anyone coming to the topic for the first time. In addition to philosophy, it is essential reading for those in related disciplines such as gender studies, sociology, ethnic and racial studies, law, education, politics, and health and disability studies.

Aidan McGlynn is a Senior Lecturer in the Philosophy Department at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, and a Senior Research Associate at the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. He is author of Knowledge First? (2014), a co-editor-in-chief of Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, and co-editor with Jennifer Lackey of The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology (2025).

Acknowledgements Preface Part 1: What is Epistemic Injustice? 1. Introduction: Epistemic Matters 2. Asking for the Moon: Examples of Epistemic Injustice 3. The Nature and Scope of Epistemic Injustice 4. Situating Epistemic Oppression Part 2: Being Believed 5. The Central Case of Testimonial Injustice 6. Testimonial Injustice, Prejudices, and Credibility Deficits and Excesses 7. Epistemic Violence and Silencing Part 3: Being Understood 8. The Central Case of Hermeneutical Injustice 9. Incidental Hermeneutical Injustice and Hermeneutical Marginalisation 10. Contributory Injustice and Epistemic Oppression Part 4: Primary Harms of Epistemic Injustice 11. Identifying Primary Harms of Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustice Part 5: Epistemic Justice 12. Towards Epistemic Justice. Index