Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity

The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides an authoritative guide to it. Few concepts have received as much attention in recent philosophy as the concept of a reason to do or believe something. And one of the most contested ideas in philosophy is normativity, the 'ought' in claims that we ought to do or believe something. This is the first volume to provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, action, and language, the Handbook explores philosophical work on the nature of normativity in general. Topics covered include: the unity of normativity; the fundamentality of reasons; attempts to explain reasons in other terms; the relation of motivational reasons to normative reasons; the internalist constraint; the logic and language of reasons and 'ought'; connections between reasons, intentions, choices, and actions; connections between reasons, reasoning, and rationality; connections between reasons, knowledge, understanding and evidence; reasons encountered in perception and testimony; moral principles, prudence and reasons; agent-relative reasons; epistemic challenges to our access to reasons; normativity in relation to meaning, concepts, and intentionality; instrumental reasons; pragmatic reasons for belief; aesthetic reasons; and reasons for emotions.

Daniel Star is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, and author of Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics (OUP, 2015).

- Introduction - Part I: The Structure of Reasons and Normativity - 1: Ralph Wedgwood: The Unity of Normativity - 2: Mark Schroeder: The Unity of Reasons - 3: Shyam Nair and John Horty: The Logic of Reasons - 4: Aaron Bronfman and J. L. Dowell: The Language of Ought, and Reasons - 5: John Hawthorne and Ofra Magidor: Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons - Part II: Reasons, Motivation, and Action Explanation - 6: Hille Paakkunainen: Internalism and Externalism about Reasons - 7: David McNaughton and Piers Rawling: Motivating Reasons and Normative Reasons - 8: Eric Wiland: Psychologism and Anti-psychologism about Motivating Reasons - 9: Benjamin Wald and Sergio Tenenbaum: Reasons and Action Explanation - 10: Bart Streumer: 1. Reasons and Ability - Part III: Reasons Fundamentalism - 11: Jonas Olson: The Metaphysics of Reasons - 12: Philip Stratton-Lake: Reasons Fundamentalism and Value - 13: John Broome: Reasons Fundamentalism and What is Wrong with It - Part IV: Reasons Explained - 14: John Brunero: Reasons, Evidence, and Explanations - 15: Nicholas Southwood: Constructivism about Reasons - 16: Paul Katsafanas: Constitutivism about Practical Reasons - Part V: Practical Deliberation - 17: Antti Kauppinen: Practical Reasoning - 18: Garrett Cullity: Weighing Reasons - 19: Joshua Gert: Underdetermination by Reasons - 20: Stephen Kearns: Reasons, Choices, and Responsibility - Part VI: Reasoning and Rationality - 21: Jonathan Way: Reasons and Rationality - 22: Corine Besson: Norms, Reasons, and Reasoning: A Guide Through Lewis Carroll's Regress Argument - 23: Clayton Littlejohn: Reasons and Theoretical Rationality - Part VII: Epistemic Reasons - 24: Kurt Sylvan and Ernest Sosa: The Place of Reasons in Epistemology - 25: Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss: Reasons for Belief and Normativity - 26: Errol Lord: Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters - Part VIII: Types and Sources of Reasons for Belief - 27: Declan Smithies: Reasons and Perception - 28: Sanford Goldberg: Reasons and Testimony - 29: Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Knowledge, Understanding, and Reasons for Belief - 30: Andrew Reisner: Pragmatic Reasons for Belief - Part IX: Types and Sources of Reasons for Action - 31: Niko Kolodny: Instrumental Reasons - 32: Douglas W. Portmore: Teleological Reasons - 33: Andrew Sepielli: Subjective and Objective Reasons - 34: Roger Crisp: Prudential and Moral Reasons - 35: Krister Bykvist: Agent-relative and Agent-neutral Reasons - 36: Pekka Väyrynen: Reasons and Moral Principles - Part X: Reasons Difficult to Categorize - 37: Ulrike Heuer: Reasons to Intend - 38: Christine Tappolet: Reasons and Emotions - 39: Andrew McGonigal: Aesthetic Reasons - Part XI: Skepticism about Reasons - 40: Caitrin Donovan, Cordelia Fine, and Jeanette Kennett: Reliable and Unreliable Judgments about Reasons - 41: Terence Cuneo: The Evolutionary Challenge to Knowing Moral Reasons - Part XII: Normativity, Meaning, and the Mind - 42: Hannah Ginsborg: Normativity and Concepts - 43: David Liebesman: The Normativity of Meaning - 44: Anandi Hattiangadi: Normativity and Intentionality