Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries

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International banking standards are intended for the regulation of large, complex, risk-taking international banks with trillions of dollars in assets and operations across the globe. Yet they are being implemented in countries with nascent financial markets and small banks that have yet to venture into international markets. Why is this? The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation explores the politics of banking regulation in eleven countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It shows how financial globalization generates strong reputational and competitive incentives for developing countries to converge on international standards. Politicians, regulators, and large banks in developing countries implement international standards to attract international investment, bolster their professional standing, and further integrate their countries into global finance. Convergence is not inevitable or uniform: implementation is often contested and regulators adapt international standards to the local context. This book contributes to our understanding of the ways in which governments and firms in the core of global finance powerfully shape regulatory decisions in the periphery, and the ways that governments and firms from peripheral developing countries manoeuvre within the constraints and opportunities created by financial globalization.

Emily Jones is an Associate Professor at the Blavatnik School of Government where she directs the Global Economic Governance Programme which fosters research and debate on how to make the global economy inclusive and sustainable. She is also a Fellow of University College. Emily's research examines the political economy of global trade and finance, focusing on the ways in which governments can exert influence in asymmetric negotiations. Emily teaches courses on international political economy and negotiation strategy and skills for public policy, specialising in international trade. She holds a DPhil in International Political Economy from the University of Oxford, and an MSc (distinction) in Development Economics from the School of African and Oriental Studies, University of London, and a first-class BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from the University of Oxford.

- Part I: Introduction, cross-country variation, and analytical argument
- 1: Emily Jones: The puzzle: peripheral developing countries implementing international banking standards
- 2: Emily Jones: The challenges international banking standards pose for peripheral developing countries
- 3: Emily Jones: The politics of regulatory convergence and divergence
- Part II: Case studies
- 4: Natalya Naqvi: Pakistan: Politicians, regulations, and banks advocate Basel
- 5: Pritish Behuria: Rwanda: Running without legs
- 6: Emily Jones: Ghana: Reformist politicians drive Basel implementation
- 7: Ousseni Illy and Seydou Ouedraogo: West African Economic and Monetary Union: Central bankers drive Basel under IMF pressure
- 8: Hazel Gray: Tanzania: From institutional hiatus to the return of policy-based lending
- 9: Radha Upadhyaya: Kenya: 'Dubai' in the Savannah
- 10: Peter Knaack: Bolivia: Pulling in two directions - the developmental state and Basel standards
- 11: Florence Dafe: Nigeria: Catch 22 - navigating Basel standards in Nigeria's fragile banking sector
- 12: Rebecca Engebretsen and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira: Angola: "For the English to see"
- 13: Que-Giang Tran-Thi and Tu-Anh Vu Thanh: Vietnam: The dilemma of bringing global financial standards to a socialist market economy
- 14: Toni Weis: Ethiopia: Raising a vegetarian tiger?
- Part III: Conclusion
- 15: Emily Jones: Conclusion: Key findings and policy recommendations