Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs

A consideration of some of the most common questions about animal minds. Do birds have feelings? Can fish feel pain? Could a honeybee be anxious? For centuries, the question of whether or not animals are conscious like humans has prompted debates among philosophers and scientists. While most people gladly accept that complex mammals - such as dogs - share emotions and experiences with us, the matter of simpler creatures is much less clear. Meanwhile, the advent of the digital age and artificial intelligence has created an added dimension to questions about non-human consciousness. In Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs, Michael Tye offers answers to some of today's most pressing questions about nonhuman consciousness. Blending the latest research about animal sensation with theories about the nature of consciousness, Tye develops a methodology for addressing the mysteries of the animal mind. Without endorsing any specific theory on the nature of consciousness, Tye tackles issues such as the animal experience of pain and fear, and the role of brain anatomy in determining consciousness. He then turns his attention to the artificial realm, considering whether complex robots could ever be considered conscious. Tye concludes with a discussion of how, if we consider animals conscious, this might impact our ethical obligations to them. From insects to crabs, fish to birds, Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs offers an insightful exploration of the ways in which animals relate to the world. Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs will appeal to students and scholars of philosophy and neuroscience, as well as general readers with an interest in animal and environmental ethics.

Michael Tye encountered philosophy at Oxford and taught at Temple University, St. Andrews, and the University of London before coming to the University of Texas at Austin in 2003, where he is the Dallas TACA Centennial Professor in Liberal Arts.

Chapter 1: Experience and Its Limits: The Problem.Chapter 2 -- Experience and Consciousness2.1 Problem Cases?2.2 The Higher Order Theory of Consciousness2.3 Phenomenal consciousness versus access consciousness2.4 Phenomenal consciousness versus access consciousness2.5 The upshot for animal consciousnessChapter 3: It's Got to be Human!3.1 Descartes and the animals3.2 Descartes and Turing3.3 Conceptualism about experienceChapter 4 - Our Friends and Neighbors4.1 Beliefs and desires4.2 Experiences and feelingsChapter 5: Reasoning about Other Species5.1 Cupcake's pain5.2 Sharpening the issue5.3 Is the absence of a neocortex a defeater?5.4 Should we be agnostic?5.5 Alternative strategiesChapter 6: A Fish Called Wanda6.1 Pain6.2 Fish nociception and fish behavior 6.3 Is there a better explanation?6.4 Fish fear 6.5 Perceptual consciousness in fish6.6 Yes, but are there really fish qualia?Chapter 7: Of Birds and Reptiles (and Fish)7.1 The origins of birds7.2 Bird emotions7.3 Birds and pain7.4 Perceptual experiences in birds7.5 ReptilesChapter 8: Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs8.1 Insect nociception and pain8.2 Insects and emotions8.3 Are bees zombies?8.4 Crabs and pain8.5 Crabs and beesChapter 9: The Girl Who Cannot Feel Pain9.1 A complaint from Block9.2 Protozoa9.3 Plants9.4 CaterpillarsChapter 10: Commander Data and Robot Rabbit10.1 The original China-Body problem10.2 Reasoning about Commander Data10.3 The silicon chip argument10.4 Real rabbit and robot rabbit 10.5 A further reason for preferring the view that Commander Data and robot rabbit are conscious10.6 A final considerationChapter 11: The Ethical Treatment of Animals11.1 Animal welfarism11.2 Speciesism11.3 Regan and Rawls 11.4 Centered speciesism and biological proximity11.5 The treatment of animals